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 Foreword
Poland is still a young democracy. The transition from an authoritarian to a 
democratic society happened only twenty years ago. It was not an easy transition, as the 
first author witnessed as a school student and later as a university student. The second 
author witnessed this transition in Poland from outside the “Iron Curtain”, as the border in 
Europe between the Western capitalistic, democratically ruled countries and the Eastern 
communist, autocratically ruled countries was called. He participated in an unusual 
longitudinal study of university students in Western and Eastern European countries. A 
research grant of the Humboldt Foundation to the first author made it possible to combine 
both viewpoints and discuss the democratic transition of Poland from two very different 
angles, not only from two different national backgrounds but also from two different 
professional points of view, namely moral philosophy and experimental psychology. 
The question from which we departed was of a general kind: How can the gap between 
democracy as an ideal and as a way real life be bridged? The answer to this question, it 
seems, cannot leave out the role of law and education.
1 A reprinted and slightly updated paper originally appeared as E.  Nowak & G. Lind (2009), “Mis-
educative Martial Law: The Fate of Free Discourse and the Moral Judgment Competence of Polish 
University Students from 1977 to 1983”. In B. Wojciechowski, M. Zirk-Sadowski, & M. J. Golecki 
(Eds.), Between Complexity of Law and Lack of Order, Adam Marszałek Editions, Torun/Bejing (pp. 
145-165, in English and Chinese). Paper presented at the Annual Congress of American Association 
of Moral Education, New York University Nov 2007. Ewa Nowak´s thanks are going to the Alexander 
von Humboldt-Foundation which supported her research at the University of Konstanz (2008-10).
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How Can We Bridge the Gap between Democracy as an Ideal and as a 
Way of Life?
The general view is as follows: Law derives its legitimacy through its moral basis 
and the process by which it comes into being. In a democracy the law is made by the 
people or its elected representatives. More specifically, it is legitimated by the shared 
moral principles on which people agree like justice, respect for human rights and law-
making according to procedures of “presumptively rational opinion- and will-formation” 
(Habermas 1996, 457). “Valid legal norms,” Habermas points out, “indeed harmonize 
with moral norms, but they are ‘legitimate’ in the sense that they additionally express 
an authentic self-understanding of the legal community” (cf., 157). Ultimately, as 
Gustav Radbruch, an eminent law-professor and former secretary of law, has observed, 
democratic law rests on the intuition of rightness (“Rechtsgefühl”).
In contrast, in an autocratic society, law is legitimated by the power of the law-
makers alone. This gives law a weak basis because the people do not take interest in 
maintaining the laws nor do shared moral principles support them. Their enforcement 
depends solely on the judgment of the people in power. On the one hand this makes it easy 
for them to utilize the law as a power-maintaining tool. On the other hand, those ones 
in power also have to resolve all disputed matters, they must find solutions for conflict 
between various laws and bear all the consequence of the mal-functioning of society. A 
non-democratic, authoritarian law can only work if those in charge are infinitely wise 
und competent rulers, which is a very unlikely scenario. An authoritarian ruler can 
coerce people by force to abide by authoritarian law, but this law will always lack moral 
legitimacy and rightness. For this reason, the law system in a democratic society has a 
great advantage over the law system in an autocratic state.
However, this view needs to be supplemented. Peoples’ intuition of rightness is not 
a sufficient basis for the functioning of a democratic society. Universal moral principles 
and specific rights and liberties are too complex to lend themselves to easy interpretation 
and application by the citizens of a democratic state. The citizens need to develop high 
moral judgment and discourse competence (Gutmann 1999; Habermas 1995; Kohlberg 
1970; 1975; Lind 1987, 2008a). Moral judgment competence, as Kohlberg (1964) has 
defined it, is “the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based 
on internal principles) and to act in accordance with such judgments” (cf., 425). Moral 
judgment competence means more than a trait of individual thinking as it also involves 
moral discourse competence. Therefore, in research studies, participants are not only 
asked to provide reasons for their decision on a particular moral dilemma, but are 
confronted with counter-arguments in order to test their ability to apply their moral 
ideals to controversial matters in a discourse situation (Lind 1978; 2016).2
2 Unfortunately, in Kohlberg’s interview method the discourse component has been dropped in the 
course of later revisions (cf. Lind 1989). In contrast, Lind has made this component a central feature of 
his test (see below).
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If the learning environment in a society is favorable, judgment and discourse competence 
can develop in their own right, at least to some extent. Yet, in the face of growing moral 
challenges in all domains of modern life, “natural” development of moral and democratic 
competencies may not be enough and must be fostered by appropriate education (Schillinger 
2006; Lind 2002). 
Finally, democratic education is a “bootstrapping process”: On the one hand, schools in 
a democracy must foster moral-democratic competencies in order to narrow the ever existing 
gap between the moral ideal of democracy and the really existing democratic way of life. At 
the same time, a democratic system is a precondition for more democratic discourse at schools. 
Obviously, this bootstrapping process hardly ever comes to an end. The world around us is 
changing fast and poses ever new challenges for individual moral judgment as well as for the 
democratic decision-making process. It even seems that this process is also never linear, step-
by-step, as 19th century philosophers like Hegel and Marx assumed, but is characterized by 
changing phases of progress and backlash. 
In this paper we want to analyze this fuzzy development of the democratic state in the 
case of Poland, a country which is considered to be one of the first communist countries in 
which democratization took place. We argue that the political processes of democratization and 
its reversal by the military rulers not only impacted the law and other social institutions but a 
(mis-) educative effect on the citizens. Clearly, political movements are not meant to educate or 
mis-educate citizens. Rather, schools are the proper agent for moral and democratic education 
(Radbruch 1993; Dewey 1966; Gutmann 1999; Kohlberg 1980; Lind 1987; 2016). Yet the 
state and its laws can also be a powerful (mis-)educative agent by providing, or withdrawing, 
opportunities of responsibility-taking and free discourse. We will present empirical evidence 
for the fact that military dictatorship during the time of martial law in Poland contributed 
not only to the strangling of the process of democratization, but also to the changing of 
democratic moral judgment competence among students. Under martial law, laws were decrees 
introduced by the military rulers lacking any grounding in generally shared moral principles 
and democratic procedures. Basic civil rights and elementary liberties were discarded or flatly 
disregarded. Especially the right to speak freely and participate in a free moral discourse was 
discarded. During the whole period of communist rule in Poland after World War II, citizens 
suffered under unjust laws, but never to the extent experienced after the imposition of martial 
law in 1981.
Our analysis has been facilitated by the availability of longitudinal data on the 
development of moral judgment competence of university students in Poland during the 
very turbulent phase of the democratization process and its reversal by military forces 
within the government before December, 1981, when General Jaruzelski seized power 
and established martial law in Poland. We will discuss the empirical findings in the light 
of three competing theories, a) education theory of moral development, b) socialization 
theory, and c) decision-making theory. Finally, we present some observations of moral 
judgment competencies in contemporary Poland. 
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The Longitudinal Study of Moral Judgment Competencies of Polish 
Students (1977 to 1983) by the FORM-Project
The international FORM-Project, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 
conducted a longitudinal, cross-national study of about 4000 university students in five 
European countries, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia (at that time still part 
of former Yugoslavia), and Poland. Poland participated three times in these assessments 
(1977-1983), the other countries four times (1977-1985). This project was co-directed 
by Prof. H. Peisert, Konstanz, and Prof. W. Markiewicz, Poznań/Cracow (cf. Bargel, 
Markiewicz, & Peisert 1982).
As part of this study, students’ moral development in these countries was assessed. 
For this assessment, Georg Lind had developed a new instrument for measuring moral 
competence, namely the Moral Competence Test (MCT; cf. Lind 1978; 2016).3 The master 
copy was written and validated in German, and then translated into Polish, Slovenian and 
Dutch. In meantime, the MCT has been translated and validated in about 30 languages and is in 
use in educational research and evaluation projects in countries such as China, Colombia, Italy, 
Mexico, Morocco, Russia, the USA, and many more (Lind 2016).
The MCT is based on Lind’ dual-aspect theory of moral behavior (Lind 2002; 2016). 
The theory asserts that when studying moral behavior one must distinguish two essential 
aspects, moral ideals or principles on the one hand, and moral abilities or competencies on the 
other. For centuries, morality has been seen purely as a matter of moral affects, i.e., as a matter 
of valuing or loving moral principles. A behavior was said to be morally good, if it was based 
on good intentions but nothing else. Many have pointed out the shortcomings of the omission 
of the consequences of one’s action from the definition of what is morally good or bad. Yet 
considering the consequences of one’s action is only one of the difficulties which we encounter 
when we pursue moral principles in every-day life. A second important aspect concerns the 
problem of conflicting moral principles. We often run into situations where more than one 
moral principle is involved and no single course of action is morally right. How can we resolve 
such a moral dilemma? 
Obviously, moral ideals are not enough. We also need an ability to translate our moral 
ideals into every-day decision-making or, what Kohlberg (1964) called, moral judgment 
competence. The dual aspect theory implies that moral ideals and moral competencies are two 
distinct but not separable attributes of the same moral judgment behavior (Lind 2016; see 
also Piaget 1976) and also that the two must be measured simultaneously and not as separate 
components through different tests. In fact, the MCT permits us to measure the two main 
aspects of moral judgment behavior simultaneously. It enables us to measure (a) six moral 
orientations as distinguished by Kohlberg (1984), which we consider the affective aspect of 
moral behavior, and (b) the ability to apply these orientations to a particular decision-making 
situation (its cognitive aspect).
3 Formerly known as Moral Judgment Test (MJT).
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The six moral orientations are measured in a classical attitude-test manner by summing 
up all ratings that represent that orientation. In contrast, the ability-aspect is measured by 
employing concepts from experimental psychology. In fact, the MCT is designed as a multi-
variate experi ment and not like a classical psychometric test (Lind 2016). After reading two 
moral dilemmas, the participant first has to state his or her opinion about the protagonists’ 
solution. Second, the participant has to rate six arguments supporting his or her opinion and 
six arguments opposing it. The respondent rates each argument on a nine-point scale from -4 
(“strongly reject”) to +4 (“strongly accept”). On each side, each argument represents one of the 
six Kohlbergian moral orientations.4 The standard version of the MCT consists altogether of 24 
arguments, each representing a certain decisional context (dilemma), a certain opinion on the 
decision made in that context, and one of six moral orientations. Thus the MCT forms an 2 x 2 
x 6 experimental design.
Because of this experimental design, the MCT allows us to determine which of the three 
different factors built into the test (decision context, opinion dis-/agreement, and moral quality 
of the argument) determines a participant’s pattern of responses. From experimental studies 
we know that most people have a strong inclination to rate arguments on the basis of their 
“opinion-agreement” rather than their moral quality (Keasey 1974). That is, most people feel 
compelled to adhere to their opinion on a certain issues rather than critically discuss their 
opinion in the light of their own moral principles, which is a prerequisite of a moral discourse. 
Hence, the core task for the participant is to rate the arguments given in the test in regard to 
their moral quality rather than their opinion-agreement. To construct a quantitative score of 
moral judgment competence, the total response pattern of each respondent is analyzed using an 
intra-individual multi-variate analysis of variance. The resulting C-score (“C” for competence) 
is the proportion of the variance of the acceptance-rating accounting for the moral quality of 
the arguments. A detailed description of the MCT and its rationale can be found in Lind (2016).
For a number of reasons, in the Polish study only one dilemma, the so-called doctor-
dilemma, was used. Hence, the C-score of the Polish students cannot be directly compared to 
those in other studies. To be able to make comparison possible, we also re-analyzed the data 
of the German university students who participated in the FORM separately for the doctor 
dilemma. Note also, that in the Polish sample the response scale was shortened to a seven-point 
scale (from -3 to +3). But this has no impact on the C-score.
The findings in regard to the affective aspect show, that, regardless of the ideological 
system, Polish students had essentially the same moral orientations as the students in the West 
European countries (Lind 1986). They preferred universalizable, principled moral orientations 
over positive law orientation, peer-group norms, and materialistic orientations, and these moral 
orientations do not change, indicating that these moral ideals are common and highly stable. 
In contrast, during the period from 1977 to 1982, the moral judgment competence of 
4 Note that we do not speak of moral “stages” because our theory of moral development does not imply 
the existence of stages as Kohlberg (1969) has defined them. We use Kohlberg’s scheme merely to 
categorize moral arguments, not people.
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Polish university students showed an unusual development. The average scores first rose and 
then sunk (see Figure 1). At the same time, university students in Germany showed a smaller 
yet continuous increase of C-scores over the full range of the study on them. Note also that the 
initial level of moral judgment competence of the Polish students was much lower than that of 
the German students, indicating that German students experienced a more favorable learning 
environment in the 1970’s than the Polish students.
Why did the moral development of many Polish university students first increase so 
impressively (more than that of German university students at the same time) and then show 
such a dramatic decrease (which was not the case with the German students)?
We believe that this phenomenon can best be explained by the process of democratization 
which occurred during that time and its reversal by the coup d’état of the military. During 
the first period of this study, between 1977 and 1979, students experienced the atmosphere 
of semi-legal discursive freedom, tolerated by some university teachers. They participated 
in the (illegal) critique of the legal order of that time and hopefully expected to change it. 
They witnessed spectacular events which raised the moral prestige of Poland in the eyes of 
the whole world: the election of a Polish cardinal as pope in 1979, the legalization of the labor 
union “Solidarity” in 1980, and the Nobel-Prize for the poet Czesław Miłosz in 1980. They 
read prohibited literature like Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, and engaged 
themselves in the anticommunist movement. 
Figure 1. The change of moral competence of Polish and German university students 1977 to 1984, using part 
of the Moral Judgment Test (only the doctor dilemma) in a longitudinal assessment (only core sample). Polish 
students (N=489) were assessed three times, German students (N=700) four times. Data source: FORM project.
During the second phase, between 1979 and 1981, the period preceding the military 
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coup d’état (which took place in December, 1981) the young democratic movement was 
smothered. The military dictatorship, it seems, not only ended the democratization 
process among institutions in Poland but also had a strong psychological impact. The 
people involved in this democratization process (of whom many were university students) 
seemed to have become aware of a chasm between the martial law of the government and 
the proclaimed moral and social ideals of a communist society (which were not so different 
after all from the moral ideals of the Western countries). But real life in communist Poland 
contrasted sharply with these ideals. This chasm created more and more dissatisfaction 
among the Polish people and finally led to the democratization process. People started to 
discuss the gap between the declared moral ideals of a communist society and the actual 
oppression they experienced in everyday-life. They discussed the injustice of the existing 
laws and the inability of the Polish government at that time to solve the growing social 
and economic problems. And by doing so they improved their ability to make judgments 
and engage in a moral discourse.
The reverse process, which happened sometime between 1979 and 1981, is not 
as easily explained. On the one hand, the moral ideals of the MCT-respondents remained 
largely intact during this period. There was no change, even less a reversal, of moral 
orientations. There was no regression of moral ideals, that is, no loss of postconventional 
moral principles or a preference for conventional and preconventional ones. What 
deteriorated was students’ moral judgment and discourse competence (for a discussion 
of the phenomenon of “moral regression,” cf. Lind 1985; 2000a). The withdrawal of 
opportunities for responsibility-taking and moral discourse by the authorities, it seems, 
was dysfunctional for the development and maintenance of peoples’ moral judgment 
competence. To better understand what happened in those times we consider three 
theoretical accounts of the processes that took place then: the education theory of moral 
development, socialization theory, and decision-making theory.
 Theoretical Accounts
The Education Theory
The education theory of moral development (Lind 2002; 2016) implies different 
courses of development for moral ideals and moral competencies. It implies that moral 
and democratic ideals are inborn or adopted by children in a very early phase of life. Each 
person has moral ideals and at least an intuition of what is “right” and “wrong.”
However, the theory also implies that moral judgment competence and democratic 
discourse competence are not inborn but need to be developed by everyone throughout his 
or her life-span, and that this development requires, in our complex world, the assistance 
of education. According to education theory, the development of moral judgment 
competence depends mostly, if not solely, on education, more specifically, on good 
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education. This theory is supported by many empirical observations and experimental 
studies. As cases of real regression of moral development have been observed, we can 
no longer assume that moral development forms an invariant sequence or that it always 
correlates with chronological age (Lind 1985; 2002). In the past decade the features of 
the learning environment could be identified which seem to be particularly important 
for this development, namely opportunities for responsibility-taking and for guided 
reflection (Sprinthall et al. 1993; Lind 2000b). Hence, educational theory of moral 
cognitive development permits us to assume that the development takes place only in 
a learning environment which leaves room for opportunities for responsibility-taking 
and free moral discourse. If students do not have access to such an environment, they 
will eventually lose their moral judgment competence (Lind 2000b; Schillinger 2006; 
Hemmerling 2014). Only if society and its educational institutions offer opportunities for 
discourse space can students practice their competencies and eventually reach a level of 
sustainable moral development (Lind 2000b). 
The dual-aspect theory permits us to discern a different impact of the political 
process on moral orientations and moral competencies: While the introduction of martial 
law did not affect the moral orientations of the Polish university students, it led to a 
regression of moral judgment competence because they were deprived of opportunities to 
practice it. In the atmosphere of hopelessness, fear and terror their judgment competence 
was disturbed. As Kant would say, we can become “virtuous” only through practicing 
“virtuous behavior”. It is only then, Aristotle would add, that “we feel the virtues at the 
right times, with reference to the right objects, towards a right people, with the right 
motive” (Aristotle 2009, 47). 
Socialization Theory 
Socialization means acquiring behavior patterns, convictions and attitudes toward 
moral rules, from outside, from the environment and figures of authority (Mischel & 
Mischel 1996). The process of socialization involves conformity and adjustment and not 
the development of autonomous moral orientations regardless of social pressure. But 
neither pressure and rigor nor imitation and norm imprinting can foster a personal moral 
motivation, a competence for moral judgment and the resolution of social conflicts. The 
growth of logical competencies and learning or even academic ethics are not of much help 
here. Especially in authoritarian education the socialization methods break down. Certain 
rules are “adopted” to gain the educator’s approval, i.e. for conformist or instrumental 
ends. Outside the relationships founded on the dependence on authority moral judgment 
behavior diverges from the educational directives. Hierarchic institutions such as schools, 
the army, prison, reformatory and rehabilitation institutions are often satisfied with 
preconventional and conventional orientations in students or inmates, because they 
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submit to the institutional rules. This is why people with high moral competence may not 
always be welcome in social institutions.
Most children already manifest a “sense of rightness” (Radbruch) already at an 
early age. Moral sensibility precedes the development of discursive skills. Habermas 
(1986, 269-270) points here to communicative and moral interests, characteristic of a 
democratic personality. Such interests are developed through democratic behavior. They 
allow a person a better understanding of social environment when he or she participates 
in a moral discourse, when his or her own and other peoples’ opinions awaken reciprocal 
respect. The growth of moral judgment competencies observed in Polish students in 
the years before martial law was introduced occurred in the discursive atmosphere of 
academic education at universities working under an undemocratic regime. This means 
that students were interested in mutual communication and recognition, as – undaunted 
by the lack of any democratic institutions in a public sphere – they had produced their 
own free discourse space, and discovered and shared social problems on their own. The 
exchange of moral opinions was constructive for them and they behaved democratically 
even though the conditions were non-democratic. They criticized official social rules and 
felt able to change these rules, too. Through free discourse activity and learning from 
each other the truth about their society they revealed the “critical interest” crucial for 
a democratic personality. Discursive socialization, in this case, depended on fostering 
democratic competencies by doing democracy on an interpersonal level. It took place in 
a student milieu, in a self-made democratic enclave created against the undemocratic 
conditions existing in communist Poland. So education theory partially overlaps with 
socialization theory. 
Yet, if morality were only the result of adopting an attitude toward external rules, 
the atmosphere of pressure in which Polish students lived after December 1981 ought to 
have negatively influenced their moral behavior and orientations too. But instead in the 
academic circles a solidary, ostentatiously silent resistance to “unjust law” grew.
Decision Making Theory 
Decision making theory (Lewin & Lippitt 1938; Brehm & Cohen 1962; Harvey at al. 
1974; Seligman 1975) assumes that actual limitation of freedom in the social and political 
environment disturbs the decision-making process. The more people treasure freedom, 
and the more it means to them in a political and practical sense, the greater their idecision, 
resignation, aversion and inconsistency can be when their freedom is drastically limited. 
This assumption seems to be supported by the fact that respondents lost some of the 
moral judgment competence that they had acquired when martial law was introduced. 
Many respondents did not return the test at all or returned an empty form.
The so-called revised decision theory (Adam 1993; Wortman & Brehm 1996; Herkner 
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2004) assumes that people make moral decisions not only on the rational level, but also 
on an “emotional level” (Herkner 2004, 91). For Dieter Birnbacher (2003), conscious 
moral emotions are associated with reflection (e.g. compassion, empathy). Reflections 
express moral acceptance and rejection, as well as a “tangible” moral attitude toward an 
object of judgment. Only thanks to moral emotions can we “construct” the relevance of 
moral phenomena. 
According to this theory, moral decisions are determined by the “right” or “wrong” 
aspects of a problem. So a person (1) with a stable level of cognition (a set number of 
alternative decisions, criteria etc. of which the person is conscious, (2) with a coherent, 
inert hierarchy of moral preferences, and (3) with a relatively stable tendency toward 
moral behavior, can make different decisions on the same moral problem if his or her 
perception of the problem changes. In such a case, judgment is based on the same moral 
criteria, but the strength of acceptance for the criteria has changed. In other words, the 
inconsistency of moral decision results depends, as Adam (1993) asserts, on mental, 
dynamic representation of the social situation: on other persons and relationships with 
them, personal share in the social problems, and the legal and political situation. Such 
representation includes cognitive and also affective elements (judgments, doubts as 
to their adequacy, experiences etc.). From the point of view of the so-called situation-
awareness theory (ibid.) we could explain the difficult moral judgments situation of the 
Polish students in this way: If a person feels that he/she does not have a control over 
his/her life situation or cannot change it, his/her decisions will be influenced by stress 
and many kinds of its side effects like: aversion, indecisiveness, “learned helplessness” 
(Seligman 1975) or “cognitive dissonance” (Brehm 1972). A permanent no-choice 
situation also disturbs moral judgment behavior. 
When martial law was introduced, people experienced politically caused stress, 
repression, insecurity and helplessness. The situation was likely to discourage people 
from using their moral competence. They felt that ‘no choice is the right one’, and that 
each decision would be regretted later (cf. Herkner 2003, 91). In this context, the excerpt 
from General Jaruzelski’s speech of 13th December 1981 sounds especially ominous: “The 
nation has reached the limits of its psychological endurance.” 
In sum, the military coup d’état in Poland had limited the opportunities for moral 
learning. Yet even before this moral judgment competencies had not been an educative 
goal of the Polish schools and universities. This topic was taboo as in most autocratic 
countries. The chasm between the political order, the authoritarian form of power 
execution and law making had always been mis-educative, as the overall low level of moral 
judgment competence of Polish university students during that time shows. The short 
period of democratization with its educational impact on the university students and the 
subsequent reversal of moral development when the democratization process was ended 
with brute force demonstrates the (mis-)educative impact that the state can have.
But this direct impact of the state on moral development is limited. In 1989 
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Polish society had obtained democratic liberties and a democratic constitution but the 
development of moral and democratic competencies was still an ongoing process. A rather 
small group of democratic activists had helped to overcome the communist dictatorship 
through strikes and demonstrations. These activists had an opportunity to learn 
democratic discourse behavior and developed moral judgment competencies through 
reflections and discussions, and by taking responsibility for the fate of their country. 
However, the vast majority of citizens still hardly participated in this democratic opinion- 
and will-formation process. They certainly shared the democratic ideal of liberty and the 
rule of just laws, but they still seemed to lag behind in the ability to apply the democratic 
ideal in every-day life. This becomes apparent in the slighting of the legitimacy of legal 
rules and in the questioning of the validity of court judgments; in viewing the law through 
the lens of the subjective “intuition of rightness” and “my right”; and in the inability to 
justify the law with the help of universal moral criteria, such as fairness, justice, basic civil 
liberties, human dignity, and respect for each human being. 
The young people born after the democratic revolution in Poland have not directly 
experienced the mis-educative influence of martial law and dictatorship. Yet, it seems, 
they also still live in a time of transition between dictatorship and democracy. Even 
today, many Polish high schools, and the university students, manifest indecisiveness 
in the public space. Their mistrust sharply contrasts with the willingness of students in 
West-European or Latin American countries to take a stance in a dilemma discussion. 
For example, a class of Polish high school students refused to vote when they were asked 
whether they thought the decision of a fictitious person presented in a dilemma discussion 
was right or wrong. It did not help that the teacher re-assured them of a free discourse 
and that they were not graded for their answers. However, the factual experience of free 
discourse in the discussion afterwards, which was conducted according to Lind’s KMDD 
method (Lind 2008b; 2016), seems to have effectively produced trust. At the end, only 
ten percent of the students refused to vote when they were asked a second time for their 
opinion on the decision. This observation implies that Polish students are in need of a 
good democratic education that strengthens their “sense of rightness.” Yet it also shows 
us that such an education would be possible and successful.
Strengthening Moral-Democratic Competencies through Effective Moral-
Democratic Education
As research studies and intervention studies indicate, education is most effective 
in promoting moral and democratic competencies if characterized by three essential 
features (Lind 2002b; 2016; Nowak et al. 2013): 
1. A communication climate of free discourse and mutual respect. What happens in 
argumentation in a free discourse is, as Habermas (1995) states, 
that the success-orientation of competitors is assimilated into a form of 
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communication in which action oriented toward reaching understanding is 
continued by other means. In argumentation, proponents and opponents engage 
in a competition with arguments in order to convince one another (…) This 
dialectical role structure makes forms of disputation available for a cooperative 
search for truth (…) In discourse what is called the force of the better argument 
is wholly unforced. Here convictions change internally via a process of rationally 
motivated attitude change (Habermas 1995, 160). 
2. Optimal moral tasks which challenge students moral judgment and discourse. 
Moral competencies are the abilities which we need to cope with moral tasks, i.e., moral 
problems or dilemmas. Coping with those tasks also helps to strengthen and differentiate 
our moral judgment and our moral discourse – but only if these tasks are not either to too 
easy or difficult. If the moral task is too difficult (e.g., if the problem is very salient for us) 
it may overwhelm or threaten us and thus prevent us from learning. The best teaching 
strategy thus is to confront students with hypothetical moral dilemmas, that is, serious 
dilemmas that are apt to stir up feelings of moral conflict but, at the same time, do not 
threaten us too much.
3. Alternating phases of challenge and support. The best way to keep students’ 
affects in an optimal balance over the whole period of a class is to alternate phases of 
challenge and support through adequate instructions. This also ensures that attention 
rates and learning rates are high over the whole time span. Many participants are aware 
of the comforting climate created by these phase changes and tell us that they intend to 
use the KMDD as a model for starting their own discussions outside the class-room.
These three criteria are in no way new. Gustav Radbruch already argued in favor of 
a broad moral-democratic education. He remarks: 
Of all the virtues, justice can least rely on intuition, feeling, and the naïve, 
unlearned consciousness (…) Justice needs abstraction of two kinds: it has to 
empathize with the situation of others and to generalize it. The generalization 
requires not only the sense of fairness, but also the capacity to make judgments. 
That capacity is difficult to develop without exercise (Radbruch 1993, 264). 
Exercising moral judgement making begins on the deep, preconscious level when 
our internal orientations are activated if we “feel” a moral problem. However, many other 
mental (cognitive) processes follow, if we hear other people judging the same moral 
problem. Beyond this, in a free discursive exchange, we experience how diverse the moral 
views can be. Radbruch emphasized that the democratic way of life is only possible, if 
people learn what the meaning of pluralism and relativism is for democratic relationships. 
People behave in a democratic way when they resolutely present their own opinion but 
also do justice to the opinions of others, (so lehrt der Relativismus zugleich Entschiedenheit 
der eigenen und Gerechtigkeit gegen die fremde Stellungnahme), and when they are not 
persuaded by any higher point of view (Radbruch 2003, 4). 
Radbruch remarks in many of his writings that the traditional “reforming of 
citizens” is not efficient as long as we only wish to change external behavior but not the 
inner orientation (Radbruch 1961, 51). He says, “this Pharisean term ‚improvement’ (das 
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allzu pharisäische Wort ‘Besserung’) should be replaced in education by a more “mind-
oriented” term (innerlich gerichtet). In his project of democratic education we find not 
only the modules of such a teaching but also some instructions concerning the teacher’s 
personality: a good teacher is not only a scientist, but also a very socially- and politically 
competent person (“the political orientation of today” is recommendable), who can clarify 
the practical problems of justice and law which are put daily by students (Radbruch 1993, 
191).
Radbruch also made suggestions as to the method to be used for an “education 
toward justice” very similar to the criteria stated above. He presupposes an educational 
space for free discourse, in which students express “their unconscious intuitions” in the 
face of a real social conflict and try to understand, “how problematic law and justice can 
be” without any interference by a know-all authority.
Effective schools already operate to some degree in accordance with these three 
criteria (Lind 2002). However, schools could foster moral and democratic competencies 
even more effectively if they applied these criteria more fully. This is shown by Blatt and 
Kohlberg’s method of dilemma discussion (Blatt & Kohlberg 1975) and Lind’s Konstanz 
Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD), which has been especially designed on the basis 
of the three criteria. The KMDD is used in schools, universities, prisons, military and many 
other institutions of education. It has proved to be highly effective when the teachers are 
properly trained (Lind 2016; Lerkiatbundit et al. 2006). Adequate teacher training is the 
key to successful moral and democratic education.
Conclusion: 
Schools Should Be the True Place of Moral-Democratic Education
An autocratic government perceives education merely as a means to secure 
its political and economic power, and seeks to prevent the development of moral and 
democratic competencies; the sole emphasis is on rote learning and persistent testing of 
standardized knowledge. In contrast, a truly democratic government perceives education 
as a means of maintaining and promoting the common good and justice, and, hence, is 
determined to make the fostering of moral and democratic competencies the core topic 
of public schooling.
However, under circumstances of crisis, we assume that these self-sustaining 
mechanisms can collapse not only in autocratic states but in democratic states, too. In 
the case of Poland in the 1970’s, the autocratic government faced an enormous economic 
and political crisis.  Food shortage, workers’ strikes and student protests prevailed. Many 
people were drawn into reflecting on the reasons for this crisis and into discussions with 
others. On the one hand, these reflections and discussions had a direct impact on the 
political system. The workers’ union  Solidarność was created and national and international 
politics responded to them. On the other hand, these cognitive processes also had an 
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educational impact, as we had reported here. At least among the university students, for 
whom data is available, moral judgment competence showed a steep increase during this 
time. Yet, while similar increases were found in Germany not only during the 1970’s but 
also in the 1980’s, this development was abruptly stopped in Poland by the military coup 
d’etat. We assume that this not only changed the public climate but also had an impact on 
peoples’ discourse behavior. The students who participated in the international FORM-
study were interviewed by Polish professors, whom they saw as representatives of the 
oppressing state. It seems that this setup of the study provides us with a very sensitive 
measurement of the degree of (mis-)trust between university students (and, by extension, 
probably also the Polish citizens in general) and their government.
 However, we should note that moral development can come to a halt, and 
moral and democratic competencies can also regress, when less spectacular forms of 
crisis occur in a democratic system. This may happen as a consequence of neglect and 
ignorance when the public loses sight of the great importance of democratic education 
for the functioning of a democratic society. Such a “creeping” crisis in the democratic 
way of life seems to be happening in many countries today, as schools become more and 
more preoccupied with fulfilling governmental achievement standards and spend less 
and less time and expertise on moral and democratic education. The growing number 
of cases of corruption and deceit in the public and economic sphere should be taken as 
a warning sign. The main function of public education in schools and universities is, as 
Tocqueville (1960/1948) once concluded from his assessment of the young American 
democracy, to preserve and to foster the citizens’ ability to uphold their rights and to 
care for one another. Thus he and other scholars agree that the schools must take up 
their special responsibility for maintaining and fostering the democratization process. 
For Thomas Jefferson (2008/1787), one of the leaders of the American Revolution, “the 
only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty [is to] educate and inform the whole 
mass of the people.“ Last but not least, the great philosopher of law and law-maker Gustav 
Radbruch (1993, 263-267) emphathized the role of the school for developing a sense of 
rightness (“Rechtssinn”) in the citizens of the democratic state: “School education alone 
is not capable of awakening the sense of rightness in anyone. This sense must manifest 
itself directly, by itself. The problem of justice reappears in the life of a school community 
almost every day. A teacher should only allow the students fully to experience what they 
live through every day, virtually every hour. He should only make them aware of their 
unconscious intuitions, and together with the students think through, from the beginning 
to the end, what they well know from their own intuitions, so that they have before their 
eyes a real, tangible example of how problematic law and justice can be.”
The aim of democratic education is to enable citizens to resolve their conflicts 
through rational discourse and not through violence, force or brute political power. 
Democratic education does not mean that we ought to teach such a consensus. A consensus 
can only be achieved through public debates and political discourse, not through a school 
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curriculum. Accordingly, Lind’s (2016) method of dilemma discussion is designed to 
foster the ability to apply moral principles to decision-making and the ability to engage 
in a moral discourse on controversial issues, not to force students to reach a consensus. 
The best an educator can achieve is that in a heated debate each and every member is 
respected by the others, that is, nobody in class is physically attacked or humiliated or 
even personally criticized for his or her opinion on an issue. This aim of moral-democratic 
education has been aptly stated by Odo Marquard: 
For this reason (…) this communication must be more than the kind of discourse 
(aiming at consensus) (…) It is precisely the oneness of discursive consensus 
which blots out manysideness, and the general then silences the particular... 
(Marquard 1994, 43).
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Mis-Educative Martial Law – The Fate of Free Discourse and
the Moral Judgment Competence of Polish University Students from 1977 to 1983
Abstract: The reprinted paper refers to Georg Lind and his colleagues’ MCT-based 
FORM study conducted at several European universities in 1977-1983, including Polish 
ones. After a short phase of democratization, in 1981 Polish society suddenly faced 
martial law. That experience had an impact on Polish students moral-, discursive- 
and democratic competences, as measured by MCT. When Ewa Nowak started her 
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation supported research stay under the supervision of 
Professor Georg Lind (University of Konstanz, 2008-2010), they were inspired to revisit 
and discuss the puzzling Polish research findings of 1981/3. According to their main 
hypothesis, martial law restricted free speech at universities, and free speech is a key 
facilitator of the development of moral and democratic competence. In 2018, after a 
decade of collaborative research on moral and democratic competence, Lind, Nowak and 
colleagues started a new international MCT study in several Central- and East European 
countries to examine the impact of the contemporary constitutional crisis in Poland (and 
the institutional crisis within the European Union) on students’ moral and democratic 
competencies. In 2018/9 the 40th anniversary of the Moral Competence Test (MCT) and 
Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion (KMDD) will be celebrated. We would like to 
provide you with the most recent research findings soon.
Keywords: moral competence; democratic comtetence; Polish students; MCT; martial law 
in Poland 1981; the lack of democratic liberties; the regression of moral and democratic 
competenties in students
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